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I. INTRODUCTION
Employer-provided benefits are now a major component of compensa-
tion. According to the United States Chamber of Commerce, the cost of
all employee benefits constituted 38.4% of payroll in 1990., More than
one-quarter of this amount, 10.5%, was attributable to paid leave, such as
sick leave, vacation, and holiday pay. That figure rises to one-third of the
total, 12.9%, when paid rest periods during working days are included (e.g.,
lunch periods, coffee breaks).' Medical benefits were the second most
costly item, amounting to 9.9% of payroll.3 Legally required payments,
including the employer's share of Social Security,4  Medicare,5  and
unemployment taxes,6 contributed 8.8%,7 while employer contributions to
retirement and savings programs (pension, profit sharing, and stock bonus
plans) constituted only 5.5% of payroll.8 The cost of other benefits was
quite small; the largest items, disability income and life insurance, each
1. JOSEPH S. PIACENTINI & JILL D. FOLEY, EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 378 (2d
ed. 1992).
2. Id.
3. Id. According to a recent study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, employer expenditures for
workplace-based health care plans totalled $221.4 billion in 1992, while employee contributions
amounted to $37.2 billion. Employers, Employees in 1992 Spent $258.5 Billion on Health Care Plans,
21 Pens. & Benefit Rep. (BNA) No. I, at 42 (Jan. 3, 1994).
4. The Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) requires employers to pay a tax (currently
6.2%) on the amount of wages they pay employees in order to finance the Old Age, Survivors and
Disability Insurance (OASDI) program of the Social Security Act. I.R.C. § 3111(a) (1988).
5. FICA also requires employers to pay a tax (currently 1.45%) on wage payments to employees
in order to finance the Medicare Hospital Insurance (HI) program. I.R.C. § 3111 (b) (1988).
6. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) imposes a tax on employers of 6.2% of the total
amount of wages paid employees. I.R.C. § 3301 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
7. PiACENTrNI & FOLEY, supra note I, at 378. The portion of labor cost attributable to legally
required payments is less than the sum of the FICA and FUTA tax rates because of limits on the
amount of wages subject to these payroll taxes. The FICA tax to fund OASDI does not apply to
employment compensation in excess of the Social Security contribution and benefit base ($57,6000 in
1993). I.R.C. § 3121(a)(1). Similarly, FUTA applies only to the first $7000 of remuneration paid to
an employee during the year. I.R.C. § 3306(b)(1). Beginning in 1994, the FICA HI tax is levied on
the full amount of employment compensation. I.R.C. § 3121(a)(1). See I.R.C. § 3121(x) (repealed for
1994 and subsequent calendar years).
8. PIACENTINI & FOLEY, supra note 1, at 378.
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contributed about one-half of 1% of payroll.9
Medical benefits overshadow pensions in coverage as well as cost,
apparently because workers place a higher value on health insurance."
In 1990, 76% of the private full-time workforce received employer health
insurance (45% with dental coverage), but only 60% were covered by any
kind of retirement or savings program." Although other benefits are not
a significant component of labor cost, cost alone understates their
significance. In 1990, 79% of the private full-time workforce received life
insurance under an employer program, while 29% received long-term
disability insurance."2 Another study showed that 85% of the employers
surveyed had a severance pay policy covering some or all employees
terminated in 1989.13
Deferred compensation and many types of fringe benefits receive
preferential tax treatment if certain requirements are satisfied. The
magnitude of these tax expenditures affords another quantitative measure
of the importance of various forms of non-wage compensation. The most
recent estimate of tax expenditures published by the Joint Committee on
Taxation finds that the net exclusion of contributions and earnings under
qualified retirement plans will reach $55.3 billion in federal fiscal year
1994, the single largest item in the tax expenditure budget.14  The
9. Id.
10. Surveys conducted by the Gallup Organization for the Employee Benefits Research Institute
(hereinafter EBRI) show that a steadily increasing majority of Americans regard health insurance as the
most important employee benefit (68% in 1992, 65% in 1991 and 63% in 1990). In 1992, 56% of
survey respondents said they would not accept a job that did not provide health insurance, while 40%
said they would not take a job that did not offer a pension plan. Carolyn Piucci, Benefits Continue to
Play Key Role in Americans'Job Choices, 13 EBRI Notes No. 12, at 8, 9 (Dec. 1992). A more recent
survey provides confirmation of these results. Carolyn Piucci Pemberton, Benefits Affect Americans'
Job Decisions, 15 EBRI NOTES No. 2, at 8 (Feb. 1994) ("Eighteen percent of Americans say they or
a family member have turned down a job offer or stayed in a job they would have preferred to leave
solely because of the health benefits, and 12 percent said they or a family member had done so solely
because of pension benefits .. .).
11. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BLS REPORTS ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990-91 4 (1993) [hereinafter BLS REPORTS ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS]. See
Virginia P. Reno, The Role of Pensions in Retirement Income: Trends and Questions, 56 Soc.
SECURITY BULL. 29, 33-35 (1993). Reno reports lower coverage rates than the BLS, apparently because
her study focused on active participation (i.e., current saving) rather than simply surveying whether the
employer maintained a plan. See Pension Coverage and Participation Growth: A New Look at
Primary and Supplemental Plans, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF No. 144, Dec. 1993, at 6.
12. BLS REPORTS ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, supra note 11, at 4.
13. PIACENTINI & FOLEY, supra note 1, at 407.
14. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., IST SESS., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1994-1998 17 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter JOINT
1994]
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exclusion of employer-provided medical benefits is expected to be $36.7
billion in federal fiscal year 1994, which is the third largest tax expendi-
ture. " Other fringe benefits are far less costly. The exclusion of
employer-provided group term life insurance premiums entails $2.2 billion
in reduced taxes in 1994, the tax-free status of employer-provided child
care costs about $600 million, and the exclusion of premiums for employer-
provided accident and disability insurance amounts to only $100 million.16
A significant and rapidly growing item-$5.4 billion in 1994, projected to
reach $12.6 billion by 1998-is the exclusion of benefits provided under
cafeteria plans (also known as flexible benefit arrangements), which often
involve tax-free reimbursement of employees' child care costs or out-of-
pocket medical expenses.'7
There have been dramatic changes in the benefits field since the passage
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). t8
Most notably, employers' cutbacks in health insurance coverage and cost
COMMITrEE ESTIMATES]. It may seem curious that the qualified plan tax expenditure is substantially
larger than the tax expenditure for employer-provided medical care when the subsidy for the former
consists of tax deferral while the latter provides outright exclusion (tax forgiveness) and when employer
costs for medical care are so much larger. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text. But if rates
remain constant, deferral of tax is financially equivalent to outright exemption of the investment return
earned during the period of deferral. See Alvin Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and
Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 717, 741 n.68 (1981). At the close of federal fiscal year
1993, private trusteed pension plans held $2.5 trillion in assets that were earning an average rate of
return of almost 15%. Celia Silverman, Private Trusteed Pension Assets Reach $2.5 Trillion by End
of Third Quarter 1993, 15 EBRI NOTES No. 2, at 5, 6 (Feb. 1994). Accordingly, taxpayers shoulder
more of the cost of retirement savings than health care because of the immense accumulation of
qualified plan assets.
15. JOINT COMMiTTEE ESTIMATES, supra note 14, at 17. The second largest tax expenditure is
the deductibility of mortgage interest on owner-occupied housing. Id. at 13.
16. Id. at 16, 17.
17. Id. at 16. Out-of-pocket medical expenses reimbursed through a cafeteria plan often include
required employee contributions for insurance coverage, as well as expenses not covered by insurance
(deductibles, copayments and excluded services). For a brief description of the benefits that can be
offered under a cafeteria plan, see infra note 24.
The Administration's tax expenditure estimates, which are published in the annual budget request
to Congress, generally agree with the Joint Committee's numbers. The corresponding federal fiscal year
1994 numbers are: $52.6 billion, net exclusion of pension plan contributions and earnings; $50.8
billion, exclusion of employer-provided medical care; $2.9 billion, exclusion of premiums on employer-
provided group life insurance; $680 million, exclusion of employer-provided child care; $140 million,
exclusion of premiums on accident and disability insurance. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
BUDGET BASELINES, HISTORICAL DATA, AND ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE 543, 548 (1993). The
Administration's report includes a rank-ordered list of tax expenditures. Id. at 561.
18. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1976)
(codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) and codified as amended in
scattered sections of Title 26 of the U.S. Code).
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shifting in response to escalating medical care costs have spawned the
current national debate over health care reform.19 Less visible, but
similarly consequential, is the proliferation of special statutory exclusions
from gross income for a variety of fringe benefits. Since 1974, Congress
has granted explicit statutory sanction for a host of tax-free employee
benefits, including qualified group legal service plans,2" employer-
provided commuter transportation,2' educational assistance programs,22
dependent care assistance,23 and cafeteria plans.24
Despite remarkable growth in the number and importance of non-pension
fringe benefits, Congress has left the non-pension regulatory regime
established by ERISA largely untouched. No such legislative neglect has
attended pension plans. Over the past twenty years ERISA has been
extensively and repeatedly amended to (inter alia): (1) tailor the application
19. The percentage of payroll spent on health insurance by private business increased almost four
fold between 1965 and 1991. Ken McDonnell, Health Care Costs: Nho Pays Nhat?, 15 EBRI Notes
No. 3, at 4, 5 (Mar. 1994). "Prompted by ever-rising costs, employers of all sizes have reduced health
coverage benefits, raised deductibles, limited coverage and switched to hiring more part-time and
contract workers in part to avoid paying health benefits." WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL,
HEALTH SECURITY: THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 4 (1993); see Health Security
Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993); HEALTH SECURITY ACT SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
(Dec. 1993); WHITE HOUSE HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE, WORKING GROUP DRAFT: THE AMERICAN
HEALTH SECURITY ACT OF 1993 (Sept. 7, 1993).
20. I.R.C. § 120 (added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2134(a), 90 Stat.
1520, 1926).
21. I.R.C. § 132(a)(5), (1)(l) (added by the Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, § 242(a),
92 Stat. 3174, 3193) (originally codified as I.R.C. § 124).
22. I.R.C. § 127 (added by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 164(a), 92 Stat. 2763,
2811).
23. I.R.C. § 129 (added by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, §
124(e)(1), 95 Stat. 172, 198).
24. I.R.C. § 125 (added by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 134(a), 92 Stat. 2763,
2783). A cafeteria plan is a flexible fringe benefit arrangement which permits employees to choose
between receiving cash and a variety of nontaxable benefits without running afoul of the constructive
receipt doctrine, Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (as amended in 1971). That is, employees who elect to
receive benefits that would be excludable under other Code provisions are not taxed on those benefits
merely because they had the opportunity to receive cash instead. The benefits available under a
cafeteria plan are known as the cafeteria plan "menu," and may include most benefits that are statutorily
exempt from taxation, such as employer-provided medical insurance, group legal insurance and
dependent care assistance, but cannot include deferred compensation (other than a qualified
cash-or-deferred arrangement), qualified tuition reduction, educational assistance, nor any fringe benefit
excluded by § 132 (i.e., no-additional-cost services, qualified employee discounts, working condition
fringes, de minimis fringes, qualified transportation and qualified moving expense reimbursements).
I.R.C. § 125(d), (f). Prior to the January 1, 1985, the effective date of the 1984 Tax Reform Act
amendments to § 125, cafeteria plan menus were also allowed to include taxable fringe benefits other
than cash.
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of the termination insurance system to multiemployer plans; 2 (2) promote
gender equity by reducing age conditions on plan participation and vesting
and by restricting the application of break in service rules;26 (3) increase
protection for surviving and divorced spouses;27 (4) greatly accelerate
permissible vesting schedules;28 and (5) strengthen the minimum funding
standards and termination insurance system applicable to defined benefits
plans.29
ERISA applies only to certain employee benefit plans.30  The statute
defines an employee benefit plan as "an employee welfare benefit plan or
an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee
welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan."3' A program
that systematically defers cash compensation until termination of employ-
ment (or longer) is a pension plan,32 while a program that provides any
of certain specifically-listed benefits is a welfare plan, whether the benefit
25. Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208
(codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 26 and 29 U.S.C.).
26. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, §§ 102,202,98 Stat. 1426, 1436 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 410(a) and 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
27. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, §§ 103-104, 203-204, 98 Stat. 1426,
1429-36, 1440-49 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1055-56, 1144 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) and
at I.R.C. §§ 401(a)( 1), (13), 414(p), 417).
28. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1113(a), (e)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2446 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 41 1(a) and at 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)).
29. Single-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, §§ 11001-19,
100 Stat. 237-82 (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.); Pension
Protection Act of 1987; Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 9301-46, 101 Stat. 1330-31 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of titles 26 and 29 U.S.C.).
30. ERISA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1988). The plan must be established or maintained by
an employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce or by one or more
employee organizations representing employees so engaged, Id., because labor title jurisdiction is
founded on the Commerce Clause. In addition, some plans are exempt from federal regulation;
governmental and church plans being the most important cases. ERISA § 4(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b).
31. ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3).
32. ERISA § 3(2)(A) defines a pension plan as follows:
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by
an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its express
terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program-
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination
of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of calculating the
contributions made to the plan, the method of calculating the benefits under the plan or
the method of distributing benefits from the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).
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is provided on a current or deferred basis.33 Because the definitions of
pension and welfare plans are not exhaustive, there is a third category of
employee benefits entirely beyond ERISA's reach:34 any non-pension
employee benefit that is not enumerated in the definition of welfare plan
is a permissible subject of state regulation.35
A benefit arrangement must constitute a "plan, fund, or program" to
qualify as either a pension plan or a welfare plan.36 To determine the
scope of ERISA courts have struggled with the concept of a "plan" in
several apparently unrelated contexts.37 This Article will examine the
emerging case law definition of an ERISA plan in each of those contexts
and show that differing considerations should be applied to further ERISA's
multiple objectives. A complete functional definition of an ERISA plan
can be derived only by reference to ERISA's policies.
II. ERISA POLICIES
ERISA prescribes two very different levels of federal regulation of
employee benefits. The lower level of regulation constrains the administra-
tion of all employee benefit plans, both pension and welfare, in three
respects. First, reporting and disclosure rules mandate the collection and
dissemination of information concerning plan terms and finances to the
Secretary of Labor and plan participants and beneficiaries.33 Second, plan
fiduciaries are held to exacting standards of conduct derived from trust
law.39 Third, state regulation of pension and welfare plans is preempted
and federal courts are granted exclusive jurisdiction to enforce ERISA's
requirements (including fiduciary duties), as well as jurisdiction concurrent
33. ERISA § 3(1) defines a welfare plan as follows:
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by
an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund,
or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants
or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical,
or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or
unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care
centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit describe in section
186(c) of this title [section 302(c) of the Labor management Relations Act, 1947] (other than
pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
34. ERISA §§ 4(a), 3(l)-(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(a), 1002(l)-(3).
35. ERISA §§ 4(a), 514(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(a), 1144(a).
36. Compare ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) with ERISA § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).
37. See discussion infra part III.
38. ERISA §§ 101-05, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-25.
39. ERISA §§ 401(a), 404, 29 U.S.C. §§ l101(a), 1104.
19941
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with state courts over suits by a participant or beneficiary to enforce the
terms of the plan.4"
Additional requirements apply to pension plans, which provide retirement
income or the deferral of income to the termination of covered employment
or beyond.4" These plans are subject to complex, intensive regulation,
including minimum standards governing the terms of the deferred
compensation program.42 Those minimum standards prevent employers
from imposing age or service conditions on plan membership that are more
exacting than the attainment of age twenty-one and completion of one year
of service,43 and they demand (among other things) that: benefits derived
from employer contributions become nonforfeitable within a reasonable
period (often five years);" a participant's spouse receive certain
protections in the event of death or divorce;4 and a participant's interest
in the plan be inalienable.46 Moreover, defined benefit pension plans are
subject to additional requirements, including minimum rates of benefit
accrual,47 minimum funding standards,48 coverage under the Pension
40. ERISA §§ 502(e)(1), 514, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(e)(1), 1144. The first component of ERISA's
two-part declaration of congressional policy provides:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce and the
interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the
disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information
with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for
fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions,
and ready access to the Federal courts.
ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (emphasis added). Recall that "employee benefit plan" is defined
to include both pension and welfare plans. ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3).
41. ERISA § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A). The second component of ERISA's two-part
declaration of congressional policy provides:
It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce, the
Federal taxing power, and the interests of participants in private pension plans and their
beneficiaries by improving the equitable character and the soundness of such plans by
requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of employees with significant periods of service,
to meet minimum standards of funding, and by requiring plan termination insurance.
ERISA § 2(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (emphasis added).
42. ERISA §§ 3(3), 4(a), 201-11, 301-08, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(3), 1003(a), 1051-61, 1081-86.
43. ERISA § 202(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(1)(A). Two years of service may be required for
plan entry if all accrued benefits under the plan are at all times completely nonforfeitable. ERISA
§ 202(a)(l)(B)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(1)(B)(i). Also, a tax exempt educational organization may
require one year of service and attainment of age twenty-six if all accrued benefits under the plan are
at all times completely nonforfeitable. ERISA § 202(a)(l)(B)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(1)(B)(ii).
44. ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053.
45. ERISA §§ 205, 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1056(d)(3).
46. ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1).
47. ERISA § 204, 29 U.S.C. § 1054.
48. ERISA §§ 301(a)(8), 302-08, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081(a)(8), 1082-86.
[VOL. 72:559
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Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) termination insurance program,49
and restrictions on termination."
In contrast, ERISA generally does not regulate the content of welfare
plans.5 Rather than restrict private autonomy, Congress chose to facilitate
it by means of the three-pronged approach described above-disclosing
plan terms and finances, imposing uniform fiduciary obligations, and
ousting state regulation. 2 Thus, ERISA monitors only the conduct of
privately-constituted welfare plans, while pension plans are subject to both
conduct and content regulation.
A. Conduct Controls
1. Reporting and Disclosure
There is an obvious functional relationship among the three components
of ERISA's conduct regulation. Reporting and disclosure provides plan
participants and beneficiaries with the information they need to monitor the
plan's administration to enforce their rights.53 Disclosure to facilitate
oversight and enforcement is a key ingredient of ERISA's conduct controls,
but disclosure serves two further goals. 4 Disclosure of plan finances may
49. ERISA § 4021(a), (b)(l), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a), (b)(1).
50. ERISA §§ 4041, 4041A, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1341a.
51. There are a few instances in which ERISA controls welfare plan terms, such as the requirement
that non-insurance plan assets be held in trust, ERISA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 1103, and the prohibition on
exculpatory clauses, ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a). But so restricting plan content is necessary
to impose uniform standards of fiduciary conduct.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
53. It was hoped that the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act of 1958 (the forerunner of
ERISA's reporting and disclosure rules) would have this effect, even though it provided no federal
fiduciary standards or remedies. S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958), reprinted in U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE AcT OF
1958 139 (1962) [hereinafter WPPDA HISTORY] (stating that bill will "permit self-policing and self-
appraisal of these plans by the participants"); H.R. REP. No. 2283, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958),
reprinted in WPPDA HISTORY, supra, at 140 ("With such information such participants and
beneficiaries will be in a better position to seek relief under existing laws of the various States and the
Federal Government against malpractices which may occur in the management and operation of such
plans."); CONG. REC. 86289 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1958), reprinted in WPPDA HISTORY, supra at 124 ("It
will permit self-policing and self-appraisal of these plans by the participants and give them a central
point in Washington to report abuses and violations.") (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
54. The three functions discussed here do not by themselves explain why disclosure is mandatory.
Why are not participants' information needs satisfied by voluntary disclosure by plan sponsors? That
is, why not rely on the market, and in particular employers' desire to attract the best qualified workers,
to supply this information? Mandatory disclosure is the central component of federal securities law,
and recent economic analyses of securities law may provide useful analogies in evaluating ERISA's
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deter fiduciary misconduct-indeed, this was the objective of the Welfare
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 (WPPDA), from which ERISA's
reporting and disclosure rules were derived.5 Disclosure also promotes
economic efficiency by providing participants and beneficiaries with the
information they need to accommodate their personal financial affairs to the
employer's program, as for example, in determining their need for
additional savings or insurance.56
2. Fiduciary Obligations
Fiduciary obligations, the second component of ERISA's conduct
controls, flow naturally from the fact that those entitled to plan assets
(principally the participants and beneficiaries) have no managerial authority
and may have limited ability to monitor plan administration.57  Division
of enjoyment and control (equitable and legal ownership) is the essence of
the trust relationship, and the trustee's obligations provided the model for
ERISA's fiduciary duties. Indeed, ERISA generally requires that all
employee benefit plan assets be held in trust. 8 This justification is
obviously incomplete, however, for fiduciary obligations apply even if the
plan is unfunded (as many welfare plans are). Under ERISA anyone who
has or exercises any discretion in the administration of an employee benefit
mandatory disclosure regime. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL IL FISCHEL, TtiE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 276-314 (1991).
55. Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958). For example, Senator Douglas, a principal sponsor
of the WPPDA, explained that the bill:
does aim to encourage-by the exposure of the financial facts to public view-honest and
more efficient management, sounder investments, more responsible trusteeship, more active
employer and employee interest, an end to conflict of interest, favoritism and looting, and
self-policing by the various groups involved.
Just as sunlight often acts as a disinfectant, we believe disclosure will tend to deter many
of the kinds of abuses our investigation revealed.
104 CONG. REC. 7061 (1958), reprinted in WPPDA HISTORY, supra note 53, at 123. Accord CONG.
REC. S6290 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1958), reprinted in WPPDA HISTORY, supra note 53, at 124 ("One of
the major objectives of the proposed legislation is to deter abuses.") (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); CONO,
REC. H15,060 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1958), reprinted in WPPDA HIsToRY, supra note 53, at 127 ("Full
disclosure of these plans can act as the most effective deterrent to mismanagement and malpractice.")
(remarks of Rep. Roosevelt).
56. This function of disclosure did not figure prominently in the debate over ERISA and has been
generally overlooked. But see WPPDA HISTORY, supra note 53 (referring to self-appraisal of employee
benefit plans).
57. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction: The Excluslve
Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1105, 1113-19 (1988).
58. ERISA § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a).
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plan is accountable as a fiduciary. 9 Here, fiduciary obligations apparently
follow from the fact that entitlement to benefits may be (and usually is)
determined by agents or employees of the employer-ERISA does not
demand independence of the claims administrator.6"
3. Preemption
Federal preemption and enforcement, the third component of ERISA's
conduct controls, obviously promotes uniformity. But the specter of
inconsistent state regulation of plans maintained by a multistate employer
may be exaggerated, for the trust or employment contracts could be drafted
to select the law of a single state. Proper planning might eliminate
conflicts in the interpretation and administration of the plan, but there is
another source of disuniformity that the employer's choice of law might not
overcome. Where a state statute mandates or forbids inclusion of certain
benefits, the choice of another state's law might be unenforceable.6"
Although selection of one state's law meets the employer's cost-based
need for uniform administrative procedures, it is not enough from the
worker's perspective. Even though any one plan could be interpreted and
administered in accordance with the law of a single state, one worker may
need to evaluate numerous alternative plans associated with different
employment opportunities. These plans may select different governing
laws (corresponding to the differing locations of corporate headquarters, for
example), making the precise contours of competing benefit offers
dependent on the idiosyncracies of several states' contract and trust law.
Under these circumstances a fully informed evaluation of competing job
offers is probably uneconomic-the cost of identifying the vagaries of
59. ERISA § 3(21). 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (definition of fiduciary), ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104 (fiduciary obligations), ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (prohibited transactions).
60. ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3). Only persons convicted of certain felonies are
barred from serving as plan fiduciaries. ERISA § 411, 29 U.S.C. § 1111. Benefit determinations by
plan fiduciaries may be challenged in court, but are generally subject to a deferential scope of review.
See generally Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits Under ER1SA, 54 U. PIr. L. REV. 1 (1992). For an
analysis of the proper scope of employer involvement in plan decisionmaking, see Fisehel & Langbein,
supra note 57, at 1126-38.
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (Supp. 1989) (stating that
contractual choice is ineffective if application of law of chosen state "contrary to a fundamental policy
of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the
particular issue" and law of the other state would be otherwise be applied); id. cmt. g ("fundamental
policy may be embodied in a statute which makes one or more kinds of contracts illegal or which is
designed to protect a person against the oppressive use of superior bargaining power. Statutes involving
the rights of an individual insured as against an insurance company are an example of this sort... !).
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alternative legal regimes would likely exceed the benefit of a marginally
more valuable compensation package.6' A single set of interstitial rules
(contract and trust) governing all plans would limit information costs and
increase the efficiency of the labor market. This could be achieved by
federal selection of the law of a single state.63 Why did ERISA create a
new body of federal fiduciary law?
In addition to uniformity, preemption apparently reflects a preference for
a particular rule. Federal fiduciary obligations may be deemed superior to
preexisting state law for two reasons. First, they mandate disinterested
decisionmaking even when no trust is involved (as with claims administra-
tion under an unfunded plan).' Second, the employer cannot contract out
of ERISA's fiduciary standards-exculpatory clauses are declared "void as
against public policy."65
The scope of ERISA preemption is exceptionally broad, extending far
beyond disclosure and fiduciary obligations. 6  This undifferentiated
62. See also 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dent) (asserting that preemption,
by "eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation" provides additional
protection to participants).
63. Compare the information cost justification of pension content controls. See discussion infra
part II.B.2.
64. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
65. ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. § 110(a). There is some indication that the cases of benefit fund
misappropriation uncovered by the 1966 investigations of the Senate Government Operations
Committee, which were highly publicized and provided political momentum for the enactment of federal
fiduciary standards, may have been facilitated by exculpatory provisions. See S. REP. No. 1348, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 27 (1966).
66. As introduced, the preemption provision of H.R. 2 (the bill ultimately enacted as ERISA)
provided that state laws "insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to the fiduciary, reporting, and
disclosure responsibilities of persons acting on behalf of employee benefit plans" would be superseded.
H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 114 (1973), reprinted in I STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE
SENATE LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE COMM., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 50-51 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter ERISA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. That language was contained in the House-passed version of the bill and was
supplemented by a rule preempting state laws relating to vesting, funding, portability standards and
termination insurance underpension plans. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 514(a), (c) (1974), reprinted
in 3 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 4057-59. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 2 also
preempted only those state laws relating to "subject matters regulated by this Act or the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act." H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 699(a) (1974), reprinted in 3 ERISA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 3820. Competing versions of comprehensive pension reform bills also
contained only subject-matter limited preemption clauses. E.g., S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 609(a)
(1973), reprinted in I ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 186; H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. §
514(a), (c) (1974), reprinted in 2 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 2920-22. ERISA's
exceptionally broad preemption rule was a last-minute innovation of the Conference Committee, for
which no satisfactory public explanation was offered. See Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of
Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 646-51 (1994).
[VOL. 72:559
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss2/2
IMPLEMENTING ERISA
rejection of state benefit law may also be the product of a preference for
a particular rule, or rather, for no rule at all. With preemption, business
interests obtained immunity from state-prescribed plan features and state-
mandated benefits.67
B. Content Controls
1. Protective Policy
a. Pension Plans
In the case of pension plans, ERISA goes beyond conduct regulation and
imposes minimum standards for certain plan terms. Such substantive
regulation assures that the promise of a pension has some minimum
content. Limited content control of pension plans has traditionally been
justified as necessary to protect employee reliance interests.68 But that
rationale begs the question: Under a regime of mandatory disclosure, is
reliance worthy of protection? If, for example, participants are made aware
that the plan does not allow for vesting, no legitimate expectation is
defeated when a pension is denied the employee terminated before
retirement age, however long her service.
Minimum standards of pension plan content "protect" reliance only in the
sense that they prevent reliance that might often be unwarranted. Hence
the justification for content regulation must lie in a concern that substantial
numbers of plan participants would not make proper use of the information
available to them. That concern may be well-founded for either of two
reasons.
Workers may misevaluate pension promises due to a systematic bias in
67. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. The absence of a convincing explanation for the
expansion of ERISA's preemption provision in conference, supra note 66, suggests that the move may
have been intended to head off concerted opposition to the legislation by business groups. Conversation
with Merton C. Bernstein, Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law (Apr. 1994).
(Professor Bernstein's book, MERTON C. BERNSTEIN, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS (1964), was
a stimulant to legislative reform efforts, and he was active in the political debate over ERISA. See
generally Karen W. Ferguson, Mert Bernstein: Pension Pioneer, 71 WAsH. U. L.Q. 999 (1993)).
68. The congressional findings include: "many employees with long years of employment are
losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to lack of vesting provisions in such plans;" and
owing to the termination of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees
and their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits; and that it is therefore
desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries... that minimum standards be
provided assuring the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness.
ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (emphasis added).
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human judgment.69 The enormous tax subsidy for qualified retirement
savings,70 with all its attendant complexities, is justified (if at all) by the
need to provide incentives to counteract an assumed tendency to
undersave.7t If such a tendency originates in overoptimism about future
prospects, people would also underestimate the likelihood that various
contingencies triggering loss of a pension would occur (e.g., severance
before satisfaction of an extended vesting period, or termination of the plan
while underfunded). That is, optimism (overestimating returns and
underestimating risks) should cause both inadequate personal savings and
overreliance on pension promises. If undersaving originates in an
overestimation of mortality risks (the "I may be dead" attitude), the matter
is slightly more complex. An exaggerated estimate of the probability of
forfeiture on death may induce inattention to other contingencies, such as
other causes of forfeiture or underfunding. For those plans that provide
spousal or survivor benefits, a tendency to undervalue dependents'
consumption would likewise cause inattention.72 In either case, unrealistic
mortality assumptions cause an underestimation of the utility of savings, yet
an associated inattention to future risks could exacerbate the problem-the
worker might casually rely on the employer's pension promise for what
little savings he considers appropriate.
This protective policy (preventing unwarranted reliance) is fundamentally
paternalistic. To the extent that content controls guard against judgmental
bias, they have much in common with the tax subsidy for qualified
plans.73 Not surprisingly, the pension content controls (imposed by
ERISA's Title I) were simultaneously incorporated in the Internal Revenue
Code (by ERISA's Title II) as additional conditions on the receipt of the
69. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Paternalism and Income Tax Reform, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 675, 684-
85, 689-91 (1985).
70. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
71. E.g., ALICIA H. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 50-59 (1982); Fisehel &
Langbein, supra note 57, at 1122-23.
72. Wiedenbeck, supra note 69, at 689-91. The spousal consent required to elect out of the
qualified preretirement survivor annuity or qualified joint and survivor annuity forms of distribution
responds to this problem of self-centered decisionmaking. ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055.
73. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 57, at 1122-23 (comparing the anti-discrimination norm,
"the bedrock principle of pension taxation," with "[a]nother manifestation of the protective policy in
pension law," the antialienation rule, which is one of ERISA's content controls). It is also interesting
to note that in 1942 the Treasury initially recommended that minimum vesting standards be enacted
along with the anti-discrimination rules as conditions on the tax subsidy. 3 Revenue Revision of 1942:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 2405-06 (1942)
(statement of Randolph Paul, Special Tax Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury).
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tax subsidy (qualification requirements). And it has been argued that
ERISA's tax provisions can be viewed as the extension and elaboration of
the antidiscrimination principle,74 which is the central criterion for
qualification because it attempts to channel the tax allowance into
retirement savings that would not otherwise occur.7'
b. Note on Health Care Reform
If pension content controls combat judgmental defects, does ERISA go
far enough? Undersaving may be the product of an inherent human
tendency to overdiscount the future (shortsightedness), but other issues may
befuddle the mind as well. In particular, one might hypothesize a tendency
to overdiscount the risk of serious medical problems (morbidity risk)-the
indestructible youth syndrome. Any such systematic bias would lead to
widespread underinsurance for health care needs, most probably by
selection of plans with inadequate limits (lifetime maxima) or high
coinsurance rates for long-term care. The enormous tax subsidy for
medical care costs is apparently responsive to this phenomenon.76 The
Clinton health care reform proposal would require that every American be
offered a choice in health care plans, but each plan would have to offer a
comprehensive package of benefits.77 This exacting minimum standard
for health plan content can be seen as the extension of ERISA's protective
policy to the welfare arena.
74. Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Nondiscrimination in Employee Benefits: False Starts and Future
Trends, 52 TENN. L. REv. 167, 173, 265 (1985).
75. Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Meet
Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REv. 419, 429-34; Wiedenbeck, supra note 74, at 246-49. But see Joseph
Bankman, The Effect of Anti-Discrimination Provisions on Rank-and-File Compensation, 72 WASH. U.
L.Q. 597 (1994) (identifying conditions that must be satisfied for anti-discrimination rules to
unambiguously improve welfare of rank-and-file employees).
76. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; I.R.C. §§ 104(a)(3) (exclusion of amounts received
for injuries or sickness under individually-purchased insurance), 105(b) (exclusion of medical care
payments under employer-provided insurance), 106 (exclusion of value of employer-provided health
insurance coverage), 213(a), (d)(l) (limited deduction for unreimbursed medical care costs, including
premiums under individually-purchased insurance).
77. See, e.g., H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1101 (Oct. 1993) (list of services included within
proposed comprehensive benefit package and requirement that package "shall not be subject to any
duration or scope limitation"); WHITE HouSE HEALTH CARE TASK FORCE, WORKING GROUP DRAFT:
THE AMERICAN HEALTH SEcutuTY ACT OF 1993 19 (Sept. 7, 1993) ("health benefits guaranteed to all
Americans provide comprehensive coverage" and the "guaranteed benefit package contains no lifetime
limitations on coverage").
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2. Information Costs
There is an alternative (and generally overlooked) economic justification
for content regulation that does not depend upon a supposed judgmental
defect. Minimum standards may respond to a problem of information
overload. For most workers, the cost of evaluating the specialized terms
and particular finances of numerous alternative plans (associated with
different employment opportunities) may exceed the benefit of a marginally
more valuable pension. Information costs may be reduced by limited
standardization (i.e., restricting the variance) of key contract terms. 78 By
reducing job search costs, content regulation may increase economic
efficiency.
From the information cost perspective, pension content controls
complement the disclosure regime. Disclosure provides access to
information, while content controls limit the volume of information to a
manageable level. Together, they facilitate career and financial planning.
It must be conceded that the existing regulatory structure is not always
well adapted to achieving this objective. To promote optimal employment
choice through informed evaluation of alternative compensation packages,
the information contained in the summary plan description and the latest
summary annual report should be made available at the job offer stage, not
months after participation commences. 79 And while some content controls
greatly simplify the task of communicating an accurate picture of the
employer's pension promise (e.g., minimum funding standards"), others
constrain plan terms that could easily be summarized and understood. In
particular, limiting age and service conditions on plan entry seems justified
only by the protective policy. Of the limitless number of possible
eligibility criteria, age and service conditions alone are restricted, even
78. Observe that this justification for content controls is not paternalistic because it does not
assume a systematic bias in human judgment (shortsightedness or selfishness). Even if workers are
perfectly rational risk evaluators and utility maximizers, detailed assessment of unregulated pension
promises may be irrational.
79. The summary plan description does not have to be provided until 90 after an employee
becomes a participant, and the summary annual report is not due for 210 days after the close of the
plan's fiscal year. ERISA §§ 101(a), 104(b)(1), (3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(a), 1024(b)(1), (3).
80. On the issue of funding, the summary plan description for a defined benefit pension plan need
only "state without firther explanation that the contribution is actuarially determined," and contain a
brief description of the PBGC insurance program. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3(p), (m) (1993). Similarly,
the summary annual report for a defined benefit plan need only state whether or not enough money was
contributed to comply with ERISA's minimum funding standards, and indicate that participants have
the right to receive actuarial information upon request. Id. § 2510.104b-10(d)(3).
[VOL. 72:559
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss2/2
IMPLEMENTING ERISA
though they impose straightforward requirements.81 Banning extended age
and service conditions cannot significantly affect information costs. It does
assure that employees who are otherwise eligible begin participation early,
making it more likely that they will accumulate adequate retirement savings
in spite of any youthful proclivity to overdiscount future support needs.
On the other hand, neither is the protective policy pursued with single-
minded consistency. Failure to either prohibit preretirement distributions
or demand that they be transferred to another retirement savings program
(e.g., rollover IRA) seriously undermines the effort to entice workers to
save in spite of themselves.8"
Even the antialienation requirement,83 which is central to the protective
policy because it bars access to pension savings prior to distribution, has
a plausible basis in a campaign to limit information costs. It was common
for pension trusts to contain spendthrift restraints long before ERISA
demanded it. But under state law, the effectiveness of such restraints is
uncertain. Questions such as the extent to which a participant's interest in
the pension plan should be treated as self-settled (rendering the spendthrift
clause unenforceable), and which classes of creditors should be excepted
from the bar, would be resolved differently in different states. Such
divergences in spendthrift law when applied to pension trusts could make
fully informed evaluation of plans associated with alternative employment
opportunities uneconomic. This information cost case for the antialienation
requirement is of course the same as one of the arguments that justifies
preemption-without uniform legal rules the evaluation of alternative plans
becomes needlessly complex. 4
To the extent that pension content controls follow from an interest in
81. ERISA § 202, 29 U.S.C. § 1052. The vesting rules, in contrast, restrict all of the myriad
possible causes of forfeiture but for two or three easily comprehended exceptions. ERISA § 203(a),
29 U.S.C. § 1053(a).
82. ERISA § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (plan that results in deferral of income to
termination of covered employment is a pension plan even if it does not provide retirement income).
See Treas. Reg. § IA01-1(b)(l)(ii), (iii) (qualified profit sharing or stock bonus plan may permit
distributions on severance of employment or merely after a fixed number of years or attainment of a
stated age); Rev. Rul. 74-254, 1974-1 C.B. 91 (qualified pension plan may permit distributions on
termination of employment prior to normal retirement). Recent IRS statistics show that there were 11.6
million lump-sum distributions in 1990, but only 29% of these distributions resulted in any IRA
contribution. The aggregate dollar amount of lump sum distributions in 1990 was $125.8 billion, 57
percent of which was rolled over into IRAs. Retirement Program Lump-Sum Distributions: Hundreds
of Billions in Hidden Pension Income, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF No. 146, Feb. 1994, at 6, 13.
83. ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1).
84. See supra text accompanying note 63.
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increasing efficiency by reducing information costs, ERISA's content and
conduct controls share a unity of purpose. To be useful, disclosure must
apprise workers of important features of a pension program without
overwhelming them; winnowing is achieved via limited standardization of
terms. Standardization is required of certain express terms of the pension
promise (content controls). By imposing uniform fiduciary obligations and
authorizing the development of a federal common law of benefit plans
(conduct controls) the unwritten terms of the benefit arrangement are
standardized as well. If the information cost hypothesis is correct, all these
devices serve the same end-promoting planning.
III. ERISA PLANS
To be subject to ERISA an arrangement providing welfare or pension
benefits must cover at least one common-law employee." In addition, the
benefit arrangement must constitute a "plan, fund, or program." 6 In two
situations the courts have concluded that an employer's undertaking to
provide some benefit of the type listed in the statutory definitions of
welfare plan or pension plan nevertheless does not constitute a "plan"
within the intendment of ERISA. First, where a special arrangement covers
only one or a few workers it has been found to be part of the individual
contract(s) of employment rather than a benefit "plan." Second, where
implementation requires no ongoing administrative apparatus, there is no
"plan," even if the arrangement would provide an ERISA-listed benefit to
many workers. Evaluated with reference to ERISA's policies, the
85. The Labor Department's regulations provide that ERISA does not apply where the only plan
participants are partners or sole proprietors, as under a Keogh plan which covers no common-law
employee. But if any common-law employee is a participant, ERISA applies. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(b)
(1993); Peckham v. Board of Trustees, 653 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1981) (sole proprietors not employees).
See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 112 S. Ct. 1344 (1992) (stating that deferred compensation
program covering insurance agents may not be subject to ERISA because "employee" construed
according to common law; remanded for determination whether agents are employees or independent
contractors). In addition, the regulations provide that an individual and his or her spouse who own the
entire interest in a corporation are not to be treated as employees of the business. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-
3(c)(1) (1993). Courts have not always followed the regulation's exclusion of plans covering only an
employee who is also the corporation's sole shareholder (alone or in combination with spouse).
Compare Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Employees Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957 (1st Cir. 1985)
(ERISA inapplicable) with Dodd v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 688 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Cal.
1988) (ERISA applied). Excluding such dual status employees from ERISA's protections has been
criticized. Matthew J. Fairless, Note, The Participant Status of Sole Shareholders Under ERISA, 55
Mo. L. REV. 1021 (1990).
86. ERISA § 3(1), (2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (2).
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distinction between individual employment contracts and employee benefit
plans is totally misguided. 7 In contrast, the focus on discretion is
justified but dangerously incomplete."
A. Content Controls
Does the core meaning of "plan" necessarily entail a general program? 9
Dictionaries in common usage indicate that the term normally conveys a
sense of prearrangement or design, but do not suggest that generality is an
inherent element.9 Nevertheless, a number of cases involving pension-
type benefits hold that when deferred compensation is extended to only one
or a few employees there is no plan, however meticulously designed the
program. Instead, the deferred compensation is part of an individual
contract of employment.
1. Restricted Coverage Cases
Three considerations seem to come into play in these restricted coverage
cases. First, judges trained in the common-law tradition seem to be
motivated, at least in part, by a (usually unarticulated) anxiety that without
some such limitation ERISA would swallow up the law of employment
contracts. This fear is ill-founded, for ERISA does not apply to all forms
of compensation, but only to post-employment compensation (i.e.,
pensions) and enumerated welfare benefits. Second, ERISA's protective
policy does not seem necessary when a deferred compensation arrangement
is specially designed (perhaps even separately bargained-for) to meet the
needs of one or a few employees. It will be shown below that this
consideration, although entirely valid, is not germane to the interpretation
of "plan." Third, some representations concerning post-employment
compensation are so indefinite or tentative that they would not reasonably
be understood to constitute a commitment. This concern obviously relates
to the design or prearrangement connotation of "plan,"'" and is also valid.
What is lacking in this line of cases is any consistent or coherent reference
to the purpose of pension content controls.
87. See discussion infra part III.A.
88. See discussion infra part IIl.B.
89. By core meaning the author refers to the paradigmatic sense of the term, which is related to
the "plain meaning" approach to statutory construction. Conison, supra note 66, at 635.
90. E.g., RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1014 (rev. ed. 1975); WEBSTER'S NEW
UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1372 (2d ed. rev. 1983).
91. See stpra text accompanying note 90.
19941
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
In Jervis v. Elerding,92 the defendant, an owner of thirteen apartment
complexes, agreed to provide the plaintiff, the manager of the units, with
an apartment following her retirement or termination. The apartment was
to be provided at no cost (i.e., free rent and utilities) for a number of
months each year equal to the number of years of the plaintiff's employ-
ment as manager.93 Relying on two questionable ERISA advisory
opinions issued by the Department of Labor,94 the district court found this
housing arrangement to be part of an individual employment contract and
not an ERISA plan.95
A forty-nine-year employee who had been told that he could expect a
substantial pension on retirement was disappointed in Harris v. Arkansas
Book Co.96  Earl Kruse, another employee with twenty-five years of
service, had not been told that the company had a pension program, but
upon retirement he began receiving monthly checks explained as a "gift for
staying with the company so long."97 When the plaintiff was discharged
he demanded his pension. The company refused and discontinued
payments to Kruse. Harris sued for benefits under ERISA, but the
employer was granted summary judgment because "[n]either the payments
to Kruse nor the promise of payments to Harris create such a plan [under
ERISA]."98
Deferred compensation promises to five employees were involved in
Lackey v. Whitehall Corp.99 Two key executives were recruited with
promises of deferred compensation; shortly thereafter identical provisions
were included in the employment contracts of three current managers. The
court held that the deferred compensation arrangement was "part of the
employment agreements with select individuals, and not an ERISA covered
92. 504 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
93. Id. at 607.
94. Department of Labor ERISA Opinion Letter 76-79; Department of Labor ERISA Opinion
Letter 76-110. Neither opinion provides any explanation for the Labor Department's conclusion.
Moreover, the latter opinion involved an employee who was a 50% shareholder and, as part of a buy-
out agreement, was to be provided with retirement compensation "for past services." Accordingly, the
"retirement compensation" may have been deferred payments of the purchase price of stock, or the top
hat plan exception (discussed infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text) may have applied.
95. Jervis, 504 F. Supp. at 608, 609.
96. 794 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1986).
97. Id. at 360.
98. 794 F.2d at 360.
99. 704 F. Supp. 201 (D. Kan. 1988).
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benefit plan."'" This conclusion was reached on the authority of Jervis
and a district court opinion that followed it,'' together with the fact that
the deferred compensation arrangement at issue failed to comply with many
of ERISA's requirements! 2
The Fourth Circuit expanded this individual employment contract
exception beyond recognition in Fraver v. North Carolina Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Co. 0 3 and Darden v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Co.' 4 Fraver involved an agency contract providing that upon termina-
tion the insurance company would pay the departing agent an amount equal
to the agent's renewal commissions for the twelve-month period preceding
termination. Payment was to be made in installments over a sixty-month
period during which the former agent was barred from selling insurance in
North Carolina. 5 This provision was included in every contract between
Farm Bureau and its entire sales force of independent agents. Twenty-five
former agents brought suit when Farm Bureau ceased installment payments
for violation of the noncompetition clause. Ostensibly relying on Jervis
and the ERISA opinion letters discussed therein, the court of appeals found
"that the agreements were simply employment or agency contracts, that the
terms in question simply established a final form of compensation for the
business created by the agent, and that these payments do not constitute
retirement income."' 1 6 Darden involved a substantially similar program
of post-termination installment payments measured by the agent's prior-year
renewal commissions, and the Fourth Circuit followed the precedent it
established in Fraver.10 7
100. Id. at 204. But see Bogue v. Ampex Corp., 976 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving
severance plan covering 10 executives on sale of subsidiary subject to ERISA), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1847 (1993).
101. McQueen v. Salida Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 652 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Colo. 1987).
102. Lackey, 704 F. Supp. at 205. Failure to comply with ERISA does not, of course, support the
conclusion that a benefit arrangement is not an employee benefit plan, for that approach would make
ERISA's "requirements" elective. Several cases have so held. E.g., Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d
1367, 1373 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (en banc) (stating that plan need not be in writing); Strzelecki v. Schwarz
Paper Co., 824 F. Supp. 821, 826 (N.D. III. 1993).
103. 801 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919 (1987).
104. 922 F.2d 203 (4th Cir.), cert. denied on this issue, 112 S. Ct. 295 (1991), revd and remanded
on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 1344 (1992) (finding deferred compensation program covering insurance
agents may not be subject to ERISA because "employee" construed according to common law;
remanded for determination whether agents are employees or independent contractors).
105. Fraver, 801 F.2d at 676.
106. Id. at 678.
107. Darden, 922 F.2d at 208.
1994]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
2. Protective Policy
Despite their results, Fraver and Darden should not be read for the
proposition that benefits provided under the terms of an individual
employment contract are not part of an employee benefit plan. Simply
replicating the full terms of a benefit program in a separate employment
contract for each worker cannot prevent federal regulation because ERISA
demands far more than disclosure of plan terms (i.e., disclosure of plan
finances, nonwaivable fiduciary protections, ousting state law, and in the
case of pensions, minimum content controls).
Instead, these Fourth Circuit decisions are best understood as rejecting
the agents' argument that limited-term payments tied to commissions
provide "retirement income" or "deferral of income," so that the arrange-
ment, however widespread and systematic, could not be classified as a
pension plan.' 8 However, this alternative ground of decision is also
mistaken. It is partially based on the notion that "deferral of income"
requires an advance set aside. But this creates a circularity problem
because it makes ERISA's applicability turn on funding, one of ERISA's
principle requirements for defined benefit plans!0 9 It also depends on an
implicit finding that "retirement income" requires long-term support
payments."' But an employee may plan to use short-duration or lump-
sum payments to provide retirement income, as by the purchase of a life
108. The Fraver court observed without explanation that the "[p]rovisions do not establish any
deferral of the agent's or agency manager's income"--this presumably follows from the fact that no
funds were set aside. Fraver, 801 F.2d at 677. The court went on to explain that the nature of
payments in the case was "not indicative of pension or retirement" benefits. Id. at 678. The importance
of this ground of decision is most apparent in Darden, which involved an annuity program in addition
to the post-termination commission installments. The annuity arrangement was held to be a pension
plan because it provided retirement income, even though the commission-based payments were not.
922 F.2d at 207-08. Moreover, it appears that although Darden's agency contract provided for
participation in both programs, it did not reproduce the terms of either. See Darden v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701, 702-03 (4th Cir. 1986), appeal from remand, 922 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1991),
rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 1344 (1992).
109. ERISA §§ 301(a), 302, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081(a), 1082. See Department of Labor ERISA Opinion
Letter 89-07A (suggesting that an unfunded incentive plan providing lump sum payments to those
employees awarded bonuses who continue to be employed for five years, could be a pension plan if,
in operation, a disproportionate number of recipients were near retirement age). For a similar circularity
problem see supra note 102.
110. The disjunctive definition of pension plan ("provides retirement income ... or results in a
deferral of income... to the termination of covered employment") makes ERISA applicable whenever
the arrangement involves either retirement income or deferral of income to termination. ERISA
§ 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A).
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annuity."' It is the long-term nature of the promise of post-employment
income, not a long-term form of distribution, that should trigger ERISA's
minimum standards for the content of the pension promise because
preventing unwarranted reliance is the objective."2
Lackey is at odds with the statutory structure and policy of ERISA.
Classification as a pension plan does not necessarily trigger the full panoply
of employee protections (e.g., prohibited age and service conditions,
vesting, and spousal rights). A plan that is "unfunded and is maintained by
an employer primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation
to a select group of management or highly compensated employees" is
exempt from all ERISA requirements other than reporting and disclosure
and the enforcement provisions." 3 Such unfunded "top hat" plans (as
they are called) are not subject to ERISA's pension content regulation
because key personnel typically have the education, judgment, and
bargaining power necessary to protect themselves. For protection, key
personnel only need access to information and to the judiciary; for that
reason, presumably, only ERISA's disclosure and enforcement mechanisms
apply.114
111. See James v. National Business Sys., Inc., 924 F.2d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 1991) (per Posner, J.)
(suggesting that a plan for key executives funded by whole life insurance and providing salary
continuation payments for ten years upon retirement at age sixty-five or earlier due to death, would be
an ERISA pension plan). Numerous Labor Department advisory opinions hold that plans providing
short-term payments at or near retirement may be pension plans. E.g., Department of Labor ERISA
Opinion Letter 75-12 (stating that a profit sharing plan that provides lump-sum distribution upon
termination of employment is a pension plan for purposes of ERISA); Department of Labor ERISA
Opinion Letter 89-07A (unfunded bonus plan).
112. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
113. ERISA § 201(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2) (participation, benefit accrual, vesting, spousal rights
and antialienation), ERISA § 301(a)(3),29 U.S.C. § I081(a)(3) (funding), ERISA § 401(a)(1),29 U.S.C.
§ I 101(a)(1) (fiduciary responsibility), ERISA § 4021(b)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (termination
insurance).
114. In practice, however, no disclosure is mandated for participants in unfunded or insured top hat
plans-not a summary plan description, nor summary annual report, nor summary of material
modifications and changes. ERISA § I 10(a)(1) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to prescribe an
alternative method for pension plans to satisfy some or all reporting and disclosure requirements,
provided that the method is "consistent with the purposes of this subehapter and that it provides
adequate disclosure to the participants and beneficiaries in the plan, and adequate reporting to the
Secretary." ERISA § I 10(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1). Regulations issued pursuant to this authority
permit unfunded or insured top hat plans to satisfy their reporting and disclosure obligations simply by
filing a statement with the Labor Department that sets forth the employer's name, address and tax
identification number and declares the number of top hat plans maintained and the number of employees
in each. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-23 (1993). Such plans are also excused from providing participants with
a summary annual report. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-10(g)(4) (1993).
Similarly, ERISA § 104(a)(3) allows the Secretary to exempt welfare plans from some or all
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The five division managers in Lackey were in exactly the situation that
the rules governing unfunded top hat plans were designed to cover."'
The Lackey court found the plan to be unfunded and, applying state law,
ruled in favor of plaintiff-employees' interpretation of the plan's vesting
rules.' 6  From an ex post perspective, the only material difference in
outcome between the court's holding that ERISA is completely inapplicable
and a holding that the deferred compensation arrangement was an unfunded
top hat plan appears to be the plaintiff's ineligibility for a discretionary
award of attorney's fees and costs. 117  From an ex ante perspective,
however, it is the employer's interest that is jeopardized-without federal
preemption employers are exposed to the risk of sweeping damage awards
(e.g., consequential and punitive damages) and state-mandated benefits."'
The manager of the apartment complexes in Jervis presents the hardest
question--can a benefit provided to one employee trigger ERISA? In
Jervis, the plaintiff was the manager of the business and presumably did
not need the protections that ERISA's minimum standards afford pension
plan participants, but that is the matter addressed by the top hat plan
exemptions."' The labor regulations indicate that a single-employee
reporting and disclosure obligations or prescribe a simplified system. ERISA § 104(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1024(a)(3). Under this authority unfunded or insured welfare plans maintained primarily for the
purpose of providing benefits to a select group of management or highly compensated employees (top
hat welfare plans) are excused from all reporting and disclosure obligations (including providing
participants with summary plan descriptions and summary annual reports), other than the requirement
that plan documents be furnished to the Secretary of Labor on request. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.104-24,
2520.104b-10(g)(5) (1993).
115. The Lackey court also drew support for its conclusion that there was no plan from the fact that
the benefit arrangement was the product of individual contract negotiations. 704 F. Supp. at 205. Such
employee leverage or bargaining power should not be taken to negate the existence of a plan. (In fact,
the arrangement developed to entice two new employees was thereafter unilaterally extended to three
prior employees.) Instead, it is strong evidence that the personnel in question are "managerial" or
highly compensated employees: they don't need ERISA's content protection, so the top hat plan
exemptions should be applied.
116. 704 F. Supp. at 207 (finding that "deferred compensation was to be paid out of the general
assets of Whitehall Corporation").
117. See ERISA § 502(g)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).
118. See supra notes 61, 66-67 and accompanying text.
119. Use of the term "group" and the plural "employees" in the statutory specification of exempt
top hat plans might be taken to indicate that multiple participants are required. But the policy of the
exemption, that interference with private autonomy is not justified where the employee has the ability
to protect herself, applies with even greater force to an arrangement designed for the benefit of one
employee. Accordingly, the important question is whether a single-employee arrangement can constitute
a plan.
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arrangement is a plan subject to ERISA,"20 and a few cases so hold.12'
Legislative history supports this position. ERISA's reporting and
disclosure rules and its definitions of welfare and pension plans are drawn
from the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 (WPPDA).'2
The WPPDA exempted plans covering twenty-five or fewer participants
from disclosure obligations."2  ERISA did not carry forward any such
small plan exemption.
124
Even more telling is the alteration made to the predecessor definitions of
welfare and pension plans. The WPPDA required that the plan be
"communicated or its benefits described in writing to the employees."'"
The writing requirement, which ERISA dropped, was designed to
"eliminate informal or personal arrangements from the scope of the
[WPPDA]," because "[i]ndividual arrangements with executives for benefits
are not contemplated as being covered by the [WPPDA].' 26  Under
ERISA executive compensation arrangements are excluded in a more
targeted fashion by the top hat plan exemptions. And while ERISA
requires all plans (other than unfunded top hat plans) to be "established and
maintained pursuant to a written instrument,"'127 the writing requirement
is now a consequence of plan classification, not a predicate of it.1
21
120. 29 C.F.R. §2510.3-3(b) (1993) ("[A] Keogh plan under which one or more common law
employees, in addition to the self-employed individuals, are participants covered under the plan, will
be covered under title I.").
121. Strzelecki v. Schwarz Paper Co., 824 F. Supp. 821, 827 (N.D. II1. 1993) (denying defendant's
motion to dismiss ERISA claims based on stock appreciation rights granted vice president). See Katz
v. American Diversified Enters., Inc., No. 91-Civ. 7667 (PNL), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14912 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 1, 1992) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on vice president's suit to enforce
alleged agreement to pay $50,000 per year for five years upon retirement, death or disability, despite
argument that single employee pension agreement is not a "plan" subject to ERISA, and observing that
authorities have not clearly resolved the issue).
122. Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (repealed 1975).
123. Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836, § 4(b)(4), 72 Stat.
997, 999, as amended by Pub. L. No. 87-420, 76 Stat. 35 (1962).
124. Early versions of pension reform legislation did exempt plans covering not more than twenty-
five employees. E.g., S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 104(b)(4) (1973), reprinted in I ERISA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 66, at 117; S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 18-19 (1973) (stating small
plans exempted to avoid inhibiting growth of pension coverage), reprinted in I ERISA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 66, at 604-05.
125. Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836, § 3(1), (2), 72 Stat.
997, as amended by Pub. L. No. 87-420, 76 Stat. 35 (1962).
126. S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1958), reprinted in WPPDA HISToRY, supra note
53, at 206; H.R REP. No. 2283, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1958), reprinted in WPPDA HISTORY, supra
note 53, at 207.
127. ERISA §§ 401(a), 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ l101(a), l102(a)(1).
128. Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1982).
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More importantly, a single-participant or small plan exception is at odds
with ERISA's protective policy. If substantive regulation of pension plans
was meant to prevent unwarranted reliance, the pertinent inquiry is whether
the risk of such reliance is materially lessened by restricted coverage.
When the terms of the post-employment compensation are specially tailored
to satisfy the interests of one or a few employees, it can be assumed that
participation is fully-informed and deliberate. The top hat plan exception
addresses this case. But restricted coverage does not by itself assure
knowledgeable evaluation-an employer's unilateral promise of a pension
to one or a few rank-and-file employees presents as great a risk of
unwarranted reliance as a general program. Perhaps more so, for restricted
coverage means there is less opportunity to be disabused by the forfeitures
and disappointments of coworkers.
These considerations are nicely illustrated by the predicament faced by
the blue-collar warehouse employees in Harris v. Arkansas Book Co.'29
Recall that there was no written plan, but on retirement one twenty-five
year employee began receiving monthly checks as a gift in recognition of
his longevity in service. The plaintiff was promised a pension, but when
he demanded it following his discharge, the company reneged and cut off
further payments to the earlier retiree. 3 ' Informal oral representations,
standing alone, may be too tentative or indefinite to induce reliance worthy
of protection.' 3 ' Statements such as "management is thinking about
making some provision for your retirement" carry their own disclaimer.
But an unequivocal representation coupled with consistent contemporaneous
practice (as in Harris) creates the kind of expectancy Congress sought to
regulate.
3. Information Costs
The information cost hypothesis suggests that content controls increase
labor market efficiency by reducing job search costs through limited
129. 794 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1986). See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
130. The Labor Department has provided by regulation that unfunded gratuitous payments to former
employees are not subject to ERISA if the payments commenced before September 2, 1974 (the date
of enactment of ERISA) and the recipient is notified annually that the payments are gratuitous and do
not constitute a pension plan. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(e) (1993). The Harris court did not indicate when
the retiree (Kruse) began receiving payments.
131. See James v. National Business Sys., Inc., 924 F.2d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 1991) (per Posner, J.)
(stating that for ERISA to come into play the plan must be "intended to be in effect, and not just be
something for future adoption" and that documents describing a plan as being tentative, contingent, or
infuturo should be considered as evidence that no plan was in effect).
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standardization of pension contract terms. From this perspective, a small
plan exception also appears unjustified. For each current or prospective
participant, the cost of evaluating an employer's pension promise should
increase as the number of participants decreases. This is because there will
be fewer knowledgeable employees to consult (it would be more difficult
for potential employees to draw on evaluations of current workers), the
accumulated experience in plan operation will be smaller, and if indepen-
dent expert advice (e.g., financial or actuarial) were desired, its cost would
be shared by a smaller group.
Although information costs generally increase as coverage decreases, the
top hat plan exception is also sensible from this perspective. A few
executives may have the expertise to self-appraise the employer's pension
promise, but these are specialized skills not normally possessed by key
employees. When a program is tailored to appeal to a "select group of
management or highly compensated employees," the employer's interest is
aligned with the participants'; to prevail in competition for highly-skilled
labor the employer will want to facilitate comparison shopping, and so can
be relied upon to shoulder the evaluation burden.
4. Welfare Benefits
The cases recognizing an individual employment contract or small plan
exception to ERISA's coverage all involve pension-type benefits. The
preceding analysis demonstrates that such an exception conflicts with the
policy of pension content controls. But should a welfare benefit arrange-
ment having extremely limited membership be immune from federal
oversight? Congress refused to constrain the terms of welfare plans, but by
"establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for
fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate
remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts," it sought to
redress the "lack of ... adequate safeguards concerning their opera-
tion."'32 The inexperience, incompetence, and abuses that led first to the
enactment of the WPPDA and ultimately to ERISA's fiduciary standards
were understood to be particularly prevalent in the administration of small
plans. 33  Accordingly, restricted coverage per se should not exempt a
132. ERISA § 2(b), (a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b), (a).
133. A proposed amendment to increase from 25 to 100 the number of participants required to
trigger coverage under the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act brought this response:
There is not a person in this Chamber who believes that the pension plans which are
operated by some of our major industrial concerns were subject to this corruption and theft.
19941
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welfare plan from federal regulation. Yet there may be some situations in
which an arrangement for the provision of welfare benefits does not
implicate any of the policies that underlie ERISA's conduct controls.
34
B. Conduct Controls
1. Controlling Discretion
Courts have concluded that an employer's undertaking to provide a
benefit described in ERISA is beyond federal supervision for a reason in
addition to restricted coverage. Where the undertaking can be fulfilled
without an ongoing administrative apparatus, there is no "plan," even if the
arrangement would provide an ERISA-listed benefit to many workers. The
source for this line of cases is Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne.3'
There, the Supreme Court held that a Maine law requiring one-time
severance payments in the event of a plant closing was not preempted by
ERISA because it "neither establishes, nor requires the employer to
maintain, an employee welfare benefit 'plan' under that federal stat-
ute."1
36
The Court distinguished its earlier summary affirmance of decisions
holding an unfunded severance program subject to ERISA because that
program entailed an ongoing commitment to pay benefits as each person
left employment and so required a continuing administrative scheme.'37
Equating an ERISA plan with an "ongoing administrative program for
processing claims and paying benefits" was supported by the policy of
preemption: conforming a benefit program to a patchwork of state
regulation would forfeit the advantages of uniform administrative practice,
whereas a contingent one-time obligation to make nondiscretionary lump-
It was primarily in the smaller, loosely organized, poorly supervised welfare and pension
plans that opportunities existed for malfeasance.
And yet the workers who are covered by these smaller plans have as much at stake, as do
the workers who are covered by the plans formulated by our industrial giants and their
employee organizations.
CONG. REc. S1748-50 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1962) (statement of Sen. McNamara), reprinted in WPPDA
HISTORY, supra note 53, at 343. The amendment was defeated.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 177-78.
135. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
136. Id. at 6.
137. Id. 17-19 (distinguishing Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140 (4th Cir. 1985),
summarily af'd, 477 U.S. 901 (1986) and Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320 (2d Cir.
1985), summarily aft'd, 477 U.S. 901 (1986)).
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sum payments entails no such inefficiency.'38 The Court also observed
that the Maine plant-closing law "not only fails to implicate the concerns
of ERISA's pre-emption provision, it fails to implicate the regulatory
concerns of ERISA itself."' 39  Looking to the legislative history of
ERISA's fiduciary responsibility rules (which apply to both pension and
welfare plans), the Court concluded that "[t]he focus of the statute thus is
on the administrative integrity of benefit plans-which presumes that some
type of administrative activity is taking place.""t4
A number of recent lower court decisions involving employer-initiated
severance programs have fleshed-out the scope of Fort Halifax. Arrange-
ments to make a readily-determinable lump-sum cash payment have been
found not to constitute an ERISA plan.14 1  Yet neither the duration of the
commitment nor payment in a lump sum is controlling, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's search for an "ongoing administrative program."
Comparison of decisions concerning unfunded executive severance ("golden
parachute") programs demonstrates that the presence or absence of
discretion in processing benefit claims is the crux of the matter. In
Fontenot v. NL Industries, Inc.,"42 the employer adopted, as one compo-
138. 482 U.S. at 8-15 (quotation at 12). The Fort Halifax majority observed that "Congress
intended pre-emption to afford employers the advantages of a uniform set of administrative procedures
governed by a single set of regulations." Id. at 11. As demonstrated above, however, employers could
secure the cost advantages of a single set of administrative procedures by including a choice of law
provision in their benefit plans. Rather, it is workers who benefit (through lower information costs)
from having all plans subject to the same set of supplementary rules. See supra text accompanying
notes 62-63. The Court relied on precedent to support its conclusion that preemption serves the
employer's cost interest in uniformity, 482 U.S. at 10-13, but the cited cases did not involve "adminis-
trative procedures" but rather state-mandated benefits. See, e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
451 U.S. 504 (1981) (holding that ERISA preempted a New Jersey statute prohibiting offsetting
workers' compensation payments against pension benefits); Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760
(9th Cir. 1980), summarily aftd, 454 U.S. 801 (1981) (holding that ERISA preempted a Hawaii law
mandating employer provision of specified health insurance benefits). In the context of mandated
benefits, of course, the employer does have an interest in uniformity. See supra text accompanying note
67. In a dissenting opinion Justice White, joined by three other members of the Court, observed that
Agsalud "involved more than administrative uniformity," and contended that the Maine plant-closing
statute should be preempted. Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 26. That approach pays heed to the employer's
interest that a uniform rule of laissez-faire apply with respect to welfare benefits. This suggests that
the majority's faulty reasoning concerning the parties' interests in uniformity may have led the Court
to adopt an unduly narrow approach to preemption.
139. 482 U.S. at 15.
140. Id.
141. Angst v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 969 F.2d 1530 (3d Cir. 1992); Fontenot v. NL Industries, Inc.,
953 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1992); Wells v. General Motors Corp., 881 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 923 (1990).
142. 953 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1992).
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nent of a takeover defense, a plan providing that selected senior executives
would receive a lump-sum cash severance payment in an amount equal to
three times the highest annual compensation received in the preceding three
years if employment was terminated for any reason within two years of a
change in control of the corporation.'43 The plaintiff, who was not
included in the program, was terminated one year after the takeover. He
sued for benefits, but the court granted the employer summary judgment on
the ground that ERISA did not apply.'"
In Bogue v. Ampex Corp.,'45 a program covering ten executives of a
subsidiary that was to be sold called for severance payments if an executive
was not offered "substantially similar employment" within ten months after
the sale. The Bogue court held ERISA applied.
In this case, Allied-Signal, the program's administrator, remained obligated
to decide whether a complaining employee's job was "substantially
equivalent" to his pre-acquisition job. Although the program, like the plans
in Fort Halifax and Wells, was triggered by a single event, that event would
occur more than once, at a different time for each employee. There was no
way to carry out that obligation with the unthinking, one-time,
nondiscretionary application of the plan administrators [as] in Fort Halifax
and Wells. Although its application was uncertain, its term was short, and the
number of its participants was small, the program's administration required
a case-by-case, discretionary application of its terms. . . . We hold that
Allied-Signal was obligated to apply enough ongoing, particularized,
administrative, discretionary analysis to make the program in this case a
"plan."146
Similarly, a plan that required a separate determination of each covered
executive's eligibility for benefits (specifically, whether post-merger
termination was for reasons other than cause) was an ERISA plan.147
This focus on administrative discretion seems sensible in light of the
Fort Halifax policy analysis: if preventing mismanagement and abuse by
fiduciaries is the central tenet of ERISA, perhaps ERISA should not apply
where there are no judgment calls to oversee. ERISA's fiduciary duty and
prohibited transaction rules apply only to fiduciaries 148 and the statute
provides a broad functional definition that classifies as a fiduciary any
person who has or exercises "any discretionary authority" in the manage-
143. Id. at 961, 963.
144. Id. at 961.
145. 976 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1992).
146. Id. at 1323.
147. Pane v. RCA Corp., 667 F. Supp 168, 170-71 (D.N.J. 1987), aftd, 868 F.2d 631 (3d Cir.
1989).
148. ERISA §§ 404(a), 406,29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1106.
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ment or administration of the plan.149  This approach is also consistent
with the limited abuse-of-discretion standard of review applied to benefit
claim denials where the plan gives the fiduciary discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.'50
Although ERISA was intended to afford participants safeguards against
abusive decisionmaking in plan administration, that role may be threatened
by the Court's incautious language in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Russell.5' There an employee whose disability benefits were cut
off, only to be retroactively reinstated five months later, sued her employer
for emotional distress and punitive damages, claiming breach of fiduciary
obligations.'52 In a unanimous decision the Court held that ERISA
section 409 does not provide a cause of action for such "extracontractual"
damages to a participant caused by improper or untimely processing of
benefit claims.'53 Rather, section 409 authorizes only the plan to recover
from the breaching fiduciary.' 4 In reaching that conclusion, the opinion
of the Court strongly suggests that a fiduciary also is not answerable to a
participant for such damages under other provisions of ERISA.' That
suggestion triggered a concurring opinion in which four Justices disavow
such broader implications. 56
Notwithstanding the cautionary admonitions of the concurring opinion,
most circuits have responded to Russell by holding that a participant cannot
recover money damages to redress a breach of fiduciary duty under
149. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
150. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
151. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
152. Id. at 136-38.
153. Id. at 148.
154. Id. at 140, 144.
155. The Russell Court stated that: "The six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found
in § 502(a) of the statute [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)] as finally enacted ... provide strong evidence that
Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly." Id.
at 146. The Court further observed: "In contrast to the repeatedly emphasized purpose to protect
contractually defined benefits, there is a stark absence-in the statute itself and in its legislative histo-
ry-of any reference to an intention to authorize the recovery of extracontractual damages." Id. at 148.
156.
There is language in the Court's opinion that might be read as suggesting that the fiduciary
duties imposed by ERISA on plan administrators for the most part run only to the plan itself,
as opposed to individual beneficiaries....
To the extent that the Court suggests that administrators might not be fully subject to strict
fiduciary duties to participants and beneficiaries in the processing of their claims and to
traditional trust-law remedies for breaches of those duties, I could not more strongly disagree.
Id. at 151-52 (Brennan, J., concurring).
1994]
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ERISA.' 57  In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,'58  the Supreme Court
confirmed that a participant cannot recover money damages in a suit under
section 502(a)(3) for "equitable relief" to enforce any provisions of ERISA
or the terms of the plan.t"9 These decisions, exacerbated by the Court's
crabbed reading of ERISA's remedial provisions,'60 create a risk that
ERISA's fiduciary duties will be found enforceable only by an action under
section 409 on behalf of the plan."6' That would leave a participant
whose benefits have been denied, deferred, or reduced due to the improper
exercise of discretion with no remedy for abusive fiduciary decisionmaking
and only a federal common law contract claim for benefits.'
62
157. Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that only benefits are available under
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § l132(a)(1)(B), and that money damages are unavailable under
ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)); Novak v. Andersen Corp., 962 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1992),
(holding that no monetary damages are available under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928 (1993); Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.), (holding neither
compensatory nor punitive damages available under either ERISA § 502(a)(l)(B) or (a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) or (a)(3)), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 61 (1992); McRae v. Seafarers' Welfare Plan, 920
F.2d 819 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (holding that extracontractual damages are not available as a form of relief
under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)); Reinking v. Philadelphia American Life Ins. Co.,
910 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that emotional distress damages are not recoverable under ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)); Drinkwater v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 846 F.2d 821 (Ist
Cir.), (stating that compensatory and punitive damages are unavailable under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988); Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding that emotional distress damages are unavailable under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3)); Sommers Drug Stores Co. v. Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir. 1986),
(holding that punitive damages are unavailable under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1034, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089 (1987); Varhola v. Doe, 820 F.2d 809 (6th Cir.
1987) (same); Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 780 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1985), (holding that
extracontractual and punitive damages are unavailable under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §
I132(a)(3)), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986). Contra Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania Teamsters
Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993) (adopting the reasoning of Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion in Russell to hold that beneficiary has direct cause of action for money damages for
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)); Warren v. Society Nat'l
Bank, 905 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1990), (holding that compensatory damages for injuries resulting from
breach of "contractual" duty are recoverable under ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § I 132(a)(3)), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2256 (1991); Vogel v. Independence Fed. Say. Bank, 728 F. Supp. 1210, 1228-29
(D. Md. 1990) (allowing recovery of compensatory damages that are proximate result of breach).
158. 113 S. Ct. 2063, 2068-70 (1993).
159. Id. at 2069.
160. Russell, 473 U.S. at 146-47; Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2067.
161. See, e.g., Sokol v. Bernstein, 803 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that legislative history
shows that ERISA was designed to protect the plan, rather than directly protect participants and
beneficiaries). See also Reich v. Rowe, No. 93-1567, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 5964, at * 11-13 (lst. Cir.
Mar. 31, 1994) (holding, on the basis of Mertens dicta, that nonfiduciary consultant, who knowingly
participated in a fiduciary's breach but did not engage in a prohibited transaction, could not be enjoined
from serving as an ERISA fiduciary or service provider).
162. Compare infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text (unfunded top-hat plans).
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Even if a participant cannot obtain pecuniary relief from a fiduciary, t63
the integrity of fiduciary decisionmaking in the claims administration
process should be policed through ERISA section 502(a)(3), which
authorizes civil actions by a participant or beneficiary "(A) to enjoin any
act or practice which violates any provision of this title.., or to (B) obtain
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to
enforce any provisions of this title . ... ."4 The fiduciary obligations
and prohibited transaction rules are, of course, prescribed by Title I of
ERISA.1 65 Accordingly, an adverse benefit determination that is founded
on a breach of fiduciary duty may be set aside and the case remanded to
the administrator under an injunction to reassess the claim without reliance
on considerations that are off limits to a fiduciary.
166
This approach protects participants from abusive decisionmaking in plan
administration. It implements the notion that preventing mismanagement
and abuse by fiduciaries is a central tenet of ERISA. Tying plan
classification to the existence of discretion (as under Fort Halifax and its
progeny) is foolish without such an approach, for the statute so triggered
would provide no real safeguards, state remedies would be thwarted, and
federal dockets would be clogged to no end. Moreover, this approach
would achieve consistency in the treatment of benefit grants and denials.
Benefits paid in breach of a fiduciary obligation are recoverable from the
fiduciary under ERISA; 67 withholding of benefits should be judged by
the same standards.
2. Protecting Funding
If the plan is funded, any person who "exercises any authority or control
163. In some cases participants have been allowed to recover out-of-pocket damages (as opposed
to punitive damages and emotional distress damages) from a breaching fiduciary under section 409, 29
U.S.C. § 1109. E.g., Vogel v. Independence Fed. Say. Bank, 728 F. Supp. 1210, 1228 n.28 (D. Md.
1990) (disavowing view that ERISA § 409 authorizes recovery only on behalf of plan); Drennan v.
General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1992), (allowing more than $3.6 million to be
awarded in class action and holding that misleading laid off employees as to the likely availability of
a more generous severance program is a breach of fiduciary duties), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2416
(1993).
164. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
165. ERISA §§ 404, 406, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1106; Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
473 U.S. 134, 153-54 (Brennan, J., concurring).
166. This approach to enforcing fiduciary standards in claims administration assumes a limited
scope of judicial review of adverse benefit determinations. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,
489 U.S. 101 (1989); Conison, supra note 60, at 33-60.
167. ERISA §§ 409, 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109, 1132(a)(2); American Fed'n of Unions v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 841 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding the administrator of a union
health fund liable for $109,000 paid to ineligible claimants).
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respecting management or disposition of its assets" is also a fiduciary,
whether or not that authority involves the exercise of discretion. 68 Plan
trustees are always fiduciaries'69 and so too is anyone who handles plan
assets, even if her duties are purely ministerial (an agent of the trustee, for
example). 17  ERISA's fiduciary responsibility provisions prohibit outright
thievery and looting of benefit funds by anyone with access to the fund,
however exalted or subordinate her position. Accordingly, the Fort Halifax
principle that there is no plan where there is no discretion is justifiable only
if the arrangement is unfunded or entirely insurance funded. 7 ' The
Supreme Court was correct to observe that preventing mismanagement and
abuse by fiduciaries is a central tenet of ERISA, but mishandling of plan
assets is as much a threat to the integrity of benefit plans as abusive
decisionmaking. ERISA's drafters understood and attempted to provide
against both those threats in defining fiduciary. The courts should not lose
sight of this as they elaborate the definition of an ERISA "plan"; federal
fiduciary regulation should come into play whenever plan administration
involves discretion or the plan is funded.
The severance payments required by the Maine plant-closing statute in
Fort Halifax were unfunded, as were the golden parachute programs
examined by the lower courts. But that presents a catch-22 for an
executive severance arrangement that does involve the exercise of
discretion: the program is subject to ERISA, but because it is an unfunded
arrangement providing deferred compensation to a "select group of
management or highly compensated employees," ERISA's fiduciary
responsibility rules do not apply. 72  Accordingly, state law is preempt-
168. ERISA § 3(21)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i).
169. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (D-3) (1993).
170. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (D-2) (1993) (stating that persons who perform various functions
"within a framework of policies, interpretations, rules, practices and procedures made by other persons"
are not fiduciaries, but of the listed "ministerial functions" only one--"collection of contributions and
application of contributions as provided in the plan"--involves handling assets); Anoka Orthopaedic
Assocs., P.A. v. Mutschler, 709 F. Supp. 1475, 1482-83 (D. Minn. 1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d. 514 (8th Cir.
1990) (holding that attorney and accountant who prepared year-end financial statements, conducted
limited audits, and provided other services that did not involve investment or handling of plan assets
were not fiduciaries).
171. If plan assets consist exclusively of insurance contracts, ERISA § 403(b)(1) waives the
requirement of a trust and the appointment of a trustee. ERISA § 403(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(l).
Labor Department interpretive rules provide that merely collecting contributions and forwarding them
to the insurance company does not make one a fiduciary. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (D-2) (1993).
172. ERISA § 401(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § I101(a)(l); Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 637 (3d Cir.
1989) (stating that no fiduciary obligations would apply to an unfunded severance program covering
sixty-one of RCA's managers that was instituted during pendency of a merger). It might be argued that
an executive severance program that is established in response to a particularjob-threatening event, such
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ed,173 yet the decisionmaker owes no duty of loyalty." The disap-
pointed participant is apparently left with only a federal common-law
contract claim for benefits.'7 This result may at first seem curious, but
it is consistent with the principle that fiduciary rules are called for when
monitoring by directly interested parties is unfeasible. 76 Key employees
are in a position to foresee circumstances causing a need for post-
employment compensation and to bargain for protection.
Are there other situations in which the feasibility of direct monitoring
obviates the need for fiduciary obligations? A welfare benefit arrangement
limited to key employees is an obvious candidate. Here, too, most
contingencies could be provided for by contract at an acceptable cost, and
to the extent that residual discretion is necessary, the continuing relation-
ship of the parties and the employer's reputational interest (including the
continuing need to compete in markets for highly-skilled labor) provide
safeguards against abuse.177 Although not authorized by statute, such a
"top-hat welfare" arrangement could be exempted from ERISA's scope
without undercutting any of the policies of conduct regulation, provided
that the arrangement is unfunded. If the program is funded, fiduciary rules
should apply because they will reduce the cost of monitoring asset
managers.'
as a pending merger or acquisition, does not involve significant deferred compensation, although Pane
is to the contrary. Pane, 868 F.2d at 637. Yet a distinction between such a particularized arrangement
and an ongoing program triggered by any change in control seems unjustifiable. Moreover, Labor
Department regulations indicate that a severance plan offering payments that exceed twice the
employee's annual compensation for the year preceding termination may be classified as a "pension
plan," 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(b)(1) (1993), which necessarily entails a finding that such program results
in "a deferral of income." ERISA § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A). If a severance plan is not a
pension plan, it is a welfare plan. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(a)(3) (1993).
173. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
174. ERISA §§ 409, 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109, 1132(a)(2) (fiduciary liability contingent on
applicability of part 4 of Title 1); Pane, 868 F.2d at 637.
175. The appropriate standard of review for such a benefit claim is unclear. In Pane, the trial court
apparently determined de novo that the plaintiffwas not covered by the plan. 868 F.2d at 637-38. The
court of appeals, which held that ERISA's fiduciary obligations did not apply because the severance
program was an unfunded "top hat" plan, did not question that approach. But in Bogue v. Ampex Corp.,
976 F.2d 1319, 1324-26 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1847 (1993), the Ninth Circuit applied
the abuse of discretion standard in an opinion that did not acknowledge the inapplicability of ERISA's
fiduciary obligations. On the standard of review of benefit denials, see sources cited supra note 60.
176. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
177. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 57, at 1131-32.
178. See id. at 1119. If the promise of benefits is limited to the assets of the fund, the employer
has little incentive to monitor fund managers because the employer is immune from liability for a
deficiency. (Such fund-specific promises are permissible because vesting is not required of welfare
benefits.) Moreover, if the employer has a reversionary interest in any excess fund assets, there is an
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3. Promoting Planning
A benefit arrangement involving the exercise of discretion or the
handling of assets should be classified as a "plan" to give effect to
ERISA's fiduciary standards. But that functional definition may be
incomplete: fiduciary responsibility is not the only objective of federal
regulation; pension and welfare plans are also subject to reporting and
disclosure requirements. Are ERISA's informational objectives weighty
enough that they should independently trigger plan classification? That is,
should a nondiscretionary unfunded benefit arrangement be characterized
as a plan because reporting and disclosure would promote better financial
planning and oversight by participants? Consider, for example, an
unfunded program to pay employees laid off because of a plant closing a
lump-sum equal to the total compensation received in the preceding six
months. Like the Maine plant-closing statute in Fort Halifax, this
contingent obligation involves no discretion and requires no ongoing
administrative apparatus. Fiduciary protections are unnecessary, but the
utility of disclosure is not so easily dismissed. Accurate knowledge of the
circumstances, amount, and timing of the payment might affect employee
savings decisions. Because the plan is unfunded, information concerning
the employer's continued financial solvency is necessary to allow
employees to gauge the extent to which they can safely rely on the
program. As this example illustrates, a definition of "plan" that is limited
to the presence of a fiduciary can, in unusual circumstances, be antithetical
to the self-protective function of ERISA.
Even in the typical program involving a fiduciary, ERISA does an
inadequate job of facilitating informed decisionmaking. In addition to
disclosure of plan terms, ERISA generally demands some disclosure of the
plan's financial condition and material information concerning plan
administration. 79 But disclosure of the employer ' financial condition is
inducement for imprudent risk-taking. See ERISA § 403(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(d)(2) (upon
termination of a welfare plan, excess assets distributed according to the terms of the plan).
179. ERISA §§ 101(a)(2), 104(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(a)(2), 1024(b)(3) (summary annual report
requirement); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-10(d) (prescribed contents).
The Secretary of Labor is authorized to prescribe an alternative method for pension plans to satisfy
some or all reporting and disclosure requirements, provided that the method is "consistent with the
purposes of this subchapter and that it provides adequate disclosure to the participants and beneficiaries
in the plan, and adequate reporting to the Secretary." ERISA § I 10(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1).
Regulations issued pursuant to this authority permit unfunded or insured top hat plans to satisfy their
reporting and disclosure obligations simply by filing a statement with the Labor Department that sets
forth the employer's name, address and tax identification number and declares the number of such plans
maintained and the number of employees in each. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-23 (1993). Such plans are
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not required, even in the case of an unfunded plan."'0 Unfunded welfare
plans are extremely common. The participants in these plans may not have
access to the information they need to assess the reliability of the
employer's benefit commitment and so are unable to protect themselves by
making alternative arrangements when the fiscal viability of the program
is in doubt. If knowledgeable, they might purchase their own insurance or
elect family coverage under a plan provided by a spouse's employer, for
example. Where the plan provides benefits in the current period the risk
of welfare plan default is not materially greater than the risk of losing the
paycheck. But the information imbalance is not so easily dismissed, for
many welfare plans entail substantial deferred compensation (e.g., retiree
health insurance, unemployment or severance payments). Hence a
financially strapped employer has an incentive to provide unfunded plans
promising generous deferred welfare benefits in lieu of higher current
compensation, and the workers who choose to invest in such future benefits
(by continuing employment, perhaps over a prolonged period) may do so
unaware of the risk."'1 A suit for breach of fiduciary duty in failing to
inform participants of the plan's shaky finances presents a conceivable
also excused from providing participants with a summary annual report. Id. § 2520.104b-10(g)(4).
Similarly, ERISA § 104(a)(3) allows the Secretary to prescribe a simplified reporting and disclosure
system for welfare plans, or to exempt them from some or all reporting and disclosure obligations. 29
U.S.C. § 1024(a)(3). Under this authority unfunded or insured welfare plans with fewer than 100
participants have been exempted from almost all reporting and disclosure obligations save the
requirement of furnishing a summary plan description to participants, and unfunded welfare plans with
100 or more participants need not provide summary annual reports. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.104-20,
-44(b)(1)(i), 2520.104b-10(g)(l), (2) (1993). Moreover, unfunded or insured welfare plans maintained
primarily for the purpose of providing benefits to a select group of management or highly compensated
employees are excused from all reporting and disclosure obligations (including providing participants
with summary plan descriptions and summary annual report), other than the requirement that plan
documents be furnished to the Secretary of Labor upon request. Id. §§ 2520.104-24, 2520.104b-
I0(g)(5).
180. RICHARD M. STEINBERG & HAROLD DANKER, PENSIONS: A FINANCIAL REPORTING AND
COMPLIANCE GUIDE 99 (3d ed. 1987). See ERISA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1023 (prescribed contents of
annual report; all accounting information relates to the plan).
181. Of course, this is the same moral hazard problem that stimulated ERISA's minimum funding
and termination insurance requirements for defined benefit pension plans. Michael Allen, The
Studebaker Incident and Its Influence on the Private Pension Plan Reform Movement, in JOHN H.
LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 53 (1990). Observe, however,
that the deception element would be involved more often in the case of a privately-held company with
a nonunionized workforce, because the federal securities laws require financial disclosure of publicly-
held companies and employee representatives in collective bargaining have access to relevant employer
financial information. N.L.RtB. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAw 651-53, 677-81 (Patrick Hardin, ed. 1992).
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remedy. But the expanding caselaw on the duty to inform"' may yet
collide with the Supreme Court's literal interpretations of ERISA's remedial
provisions." 3
IV. CONCLUSION
ERISA's failure to reveal the employer's financial condition-the
ultimate fiscal backing of an unfunded or underfunded plan-suggests that
the employee planning objective is subsidiary to the oversight (i.e.,
monitoring plan administration) and deterrence (i.e., discouraging fiduciary
misconduct) functions of disclosure.'84 That statutory omission is part of
a larger cause for concern. Preemption should also facilitate planning by
both employees (evaluation of interstitial plan rules, e.g., fiduciary law) and
employers (making benefit commitments voluntary and predictable by
outlawing mandated benefits). 5 Yet the Supreme Court has overlooked
or slighted those purposes." 6 Moreover, the information cost justification
for pension content controls, also designed to facilitate planning, has been
completely ignored. 7 These goals are fundamental; they should come
into play first in the definition of an ERISA plan (goals must inform
scope), and throughout the elaboration of ERISA's requirements. Congress,
courts and commentators need to reassess priorities. Absent increased
attention to the autonomy-promoting, empowering aspects of ERISA-to
the planning perspective-federal regulation of employee benefits may
breed increased dependency and distrust. 8
182. Recent cases in the courts of appeals expand the duty to inform to cover prospective changes
in benefit programs that are under serious consideration. See, e.g., Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d
697 (Ist Cir. 1994); Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct,
622 (1993); Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1993).
183. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56. In Fort Halifax the Supreme Court's reading of
ERISA's legislative history indicated that it understood oversight and deterrence were the purposes of
disclosure. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1987) (quoting congressional debate
mentioning disclosure to prevent abuses and permit monitoring, and observing that "[n]o financial
transactions take place that would be listed in an annual report, and no further information regarding
the terms of the severance pay obligation is needed because the statute itself makes these terms clear").
185. See supra text accompanying notes 61-67.
186. See supra note 138.
187. See discussion supra part II.B.2.
188. The author has defended paternalism in other contexts, within appropriate limits. Wiedenbeck,
supra note 69, at 699-700 (tax expenditures generally); Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Missouri's Repeal of the
Claflin Doctrine-New View of the Policy Against Perpetuities?, 50 Mo. L. REV. 805, 830-33 (1985)
(private trusts and the rule against perpetuities). The point here is not that the protective policy is
necessarily misapplied in the pension context, but that it has been pursued to the exclusion of other
important values.
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